The securities market is the fundamental theo retical framework in economics and finance for resource allocation under uncertainty. Securi ties serve both to reallocate risk and to dissem inate probabilistic information. Complete securi ties markets-which contain one security for ev ery possible state of nature-support Pareto op timal allocations of risk. Complete markets suf fer from the same exponential dependence on the number of underlying events as do joint probabil ity distributions. We examine whether markets can be structured and "compacted" in the same manner as Bayesian network representations of joint distributions. We show that, if all agents' risk-neutral independencies agree with the inde pendencies encoded in the market structure, then the market is operationally complete: risk is still Pareto optimally allocated, yet the number of se curities can be exponentially smaller. For col lections of agents of a certain type, agreement on Markov independencies is sufficient to admit compact and operationally complete markets.
INTRODUCTION
A large portion of the world's economic transactions in volve the exchange of risk. For example, insurance policy holders transfer some of their risks to insurance providers, in exchange for sure payments. Farmers hedge against the dangers of adverse weather by exchanging futures with less risk-averse speculators. Insurance contracts, futures, op tions, derivatives, and even stocks, serve to continuously reallocate risk around the globe.
All of these potentially complex financial instruments can be modeled as portfolios of much simpler instruments, called securities. Securities are essentially lottery tickets: they pay off in some good (e.g., money) contingent on the Michael P. Wellman University of Michigan AI Laboratory 1101 Beal Avenue Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2 110 USA wellman @umich.edu outcomes of uncertain events. A key result in the theory of economics under uncertainty is that, if agents have access to "enough" securities (i.e., access to a complete market), then equilibrium allocations of risk are Pareto optimal. Un fortunately, "enough" is, for all intents and purposes, too much: the number of required securities is equal to the size of the joint space of all relevant uncertain events, and is thus intractable in any realistic setting.
The prospect of representing probabilities over joint event spaces was once viewed in much the same light theoretically ideal, but practically unachievable. The ad vent of graphical modeling languages, and in particular Bayesian networks (BNs), changed this view dramatically. These languages permit concise descriptions of otherwise unwieldy joint distributions, as long as sufficient condi tional independencies among events are present. In this paper, we demonstrate that, among certain populations of agents, conditional independence can be analogously ex ploited in the design and configuration of securities mar kets.
Section 4 shows how securities markets can be structured according the the topology of any BN. As with BNs, if suf ficient independencies are encoded in the structure, the size of the market is exponentially reduced. Although struc tured markets are not complete in the traditional sense, we derive conditions under which they are nonetheless opera tionally complete, meaning that the equilibrium allocation of risk is still Pareto optimal. Section 5.1 gives a general sufficient condition: if, in equilibrium, all agents' risk neutral independencies agree with those encoded in the market's structure, then the market is operationally com plete. Section 5.2 characterizes the computational com plexity of pricing securities and finding arbitrage opportu nities in a structured market. Section 6 derives a special case when agreement on true independencies is sufficient to yield operationally complete markets; we also explain why agreement on true independencies is not sufficient in general.
We consider a model economy of N agents, indexed i = 1, 2, ... , N, each with a subjective probability distribution Pr; over states of the world and a utility function u; for money. Denote the set of all possible states of the world as n = {WI, Wz, ... } . The w are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
State is often more concisely and naturally characterized as the set of outcomes of events. Denote the set of mod eled events as Z = { A 1 , Az, ... , A M }. Underlying M arbitrary events is a state space n of size IDI = 2 M ' consisting of all possible combinations of event outcomes. Conversely, any set of states can be factored into a set of M = flg IDil events. Without further assumption, the two representations are equivalent in both expressivity and size, although the event factorization may be more natural. In most of what follows, the events {Aj} are the focus of at tention, with n the implied joint outcome space. We refer to the { Aj} as the primary events, so as to distinguish them from the other 22M -M possible sets of states, each of which is also an event.
DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In general, an agent's utility is defined over the cross prod uct of available actions and possible states. We assume here that utility arises from an underlying utility for money. If agent i's utility for JL dollars is u(JL), then its utility U for a particular action a is its expected utility for money, U;(a) = E; [u; (riw))] = L Pr;(w)u; (riw)), (1) w EO where r;w) is agent i's wealth in dollars when action a is taken in state w (the dependence of r;w) on a is implicit). Agent i's decisions are made by maximizing expected util ity, or choosing the action a that maximizes (1).
We assume throughout that utility increases monotonically with wealth. Local risk aversion at JL, denoted r;(JL), is defi ned as r;(JL) = -u�'(JL)/uHJL). Agent i is risk-averse if r;(JL) > 0 for all JL, or, equivalently, if u; is everywhere concave. Under this condition, the agent always prefers a guaranteed payment equal to the expected value of a lottery rather than the lottery itself, thus exhibiting an "aversion" to gambling. The agent is risk-neutral if r;(JL) = 0 for all JL, or u; is linear; in this case, maximizing (1) coincides with maximizing expected payoff.
RISK-NEUTRAL PROBABILITY
Notice that an outside observer 0, privy only to agent i's chosen actions, cannot uniquely discern either the agent's belief or its utility: the two quantities are inextricably linked (Kadane & Winkler, 1988) . Any one of a continuous family of belief-utility pairs offers an equally valid ratio nalization for the agent's actions. That is, for any function f(w), subjective probabilities proportional to Pr;(w)f(w) matched with utilities u; ('riw)) /f(w) result in strategi cally equivalent utilities for actions U; (a).
Risk-neutral probabilities are defined as Pr�N(w) ex Pr;(w)u� (riw)), (2) where u� is the derivative of utility (Nau, 1995) . Agent i's observable behavior, manifested as actions, is in distinguishable from that of a hypothetical agent with transformed probabilities Pr�N (w) and reciprocally transformed utility u�N(JL) = u;(JL)/u� (riw)). It turns out that the observer can uniquely assess agent i's risk-neutral probabilities. In fact, all standard elicitation procedures de signed to reveal agent i's beliefs based on monetary incen tives (de Finetti, 1974; Winkler & Murphy, 1968 )-for ex ample, querying the prices at which the agent would buy or sell various lottery tickets-essentially reveal Pr�N, and not Pr; (Kadane & Winkler, 1988) . The agent's observable beliefs are in effect its risk neutral probabilities, not its true probabilities.
SECURITIES MARKETS FOR THE

REALLOCATION OF RISK
Under uncertainty, risk-averse agents will desire to hedge or insure against their risks by distributing wealth across states. For example, insuring the delivery of a package ef fectively transfers wealth from the package-received state to the package-lost state. The Arrow-Debreu securities market is the fundamental theoretical framework in eco nomics and fi nance for resource allocation under uncer tainty (Arrow, 1964; Dreze, 1987; Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995) . A security, denominated in money or other exchangeable good, pays off variously contingent upon the realization of an uncertain state. Let (A} denote a security that pays off one dollar if and only if the event A occurs. If the price of this security is p(A) per unit, then agent i's decision to purchase xiA) units is equivalent to accepting a lottery with payoff (1-p(A))xlA ) if A occurs, and -p( A) XlA) otherwise. Positive xiA) indicates a quan tity to buy, and negative x;A) a quantity to sell.
In a market of S such securities, let p (p(1) ,p(2), ••• ,p(8)) denote the securities' prices, and x; = (x; 1 ), x?), ... , x;s)} denote the quantities of the securities held by agent i. Agent i's utility for securities is its expected utility for money (1), where the agent's choice of actions is how much to buy or sell of each security.
Agents trade securities with each other prior to revelation of the world state. In an economy of N agents, each con tinually maximizing (1), prices adjust until all buy orders match with sell orders for all securities. A market is in competitive equilibrium at prices p if and only if
i=l where xi(P) is agent i's optimal demand vector at prices p.
A securities market is termed complete if it contains at least lr!l-1 linearly independent securities. Such a market guar antees, under classical assumptions, that equilibrium en tails a Pareto optimal, or efficient, allocation of risk.
A conditional security (A1IA2) pays off contingent on A 1 and conditional on A2. That is, if A2 occurs, then it pays out exactly as (A 1 ); on the other hand, if A2 occurs, then the bet is called off and any price paid for the security is re funded (de Finetti, 1974) . The canonical complete market consists of one security paying out in each state of nature. In general, though, any set of securities (possibly including conditionals) with a payoff-by-state matrix of rank If! I -1 is complete.
When one unit of each security pays out one dollar, the equilibrium prices in a securities market form a coherent
In fact, the equilibrium prices coincide with the agents' risk-neutral prob abilities (2) for the available securities, which must be in complete agreement (Dreze, 1987; Nau & McCardle, 1991) . Derived formally in Section 3.1, we simply sketch the intuition here. Since a risk-neutral agent buys (Aj) if p (A j ) < Pri(Aj) (it simply maximizes expected pay off), then any agent buys (Aj) if p(A j ) < Pr�N(Aj) · Similarly, the agent sells if p ( A i ) > Pr�N(Aj). If two agents h and i have differing risk neutral probabilities that is, Pr�N(Aj) "f:. Pr�N(Aj)-then there is an inter mediate price at which they are both willing to trade. It follows that, at equilibrium, when by definition opportu nities for exchange have been exhausted, all agents' risk neutral probabilities agree across available securities. Fur thermore, since offers to buy and sell must match, the equi librium prices equal these consensus probabilities.
There are two, largely inseparable, reasons for agents to trade in securities: to insure against risk ("hedge") and to profit from perceived mispricings ("speculate"). The more averse to risk, the more the former consideration dom inates an agent's decision making. On the other hand, risk-neutrality-the limit of diminishing risk aversion-is synonymous with pure speculation. These two behaviors are aligned with the two central roles of securities mar kets in the theory of economics under uncertainty. The first, as mentioned, is to support the reallocation of risk. The second is to aggregate and disseminate information. Agents that disagree on the likelihood of states may seek to exchange securities at prices that yield, according to each's subjective viewpoint, an increase in expected re turns. Moreover, each agent is privy, albeit implicitly, to the evidence gathered by other agents (perhaps at great cost) via fluctuations in price.
BAYESIAN NETWORKS
A joint probability distribution can often be represented more compactly as a Bayesian network (BN), or other graphical model (Darroch, Lauritzen, & Speed, 1980) . Conciseness is achieved by exploiting conditional indepen dence among the primary events. Let CI[Aj, W, X] be shorthand for Pr(AjiWX) = Pr(AjiW ), indicating that Aj is conditionally independent of the set of events X, given another set W. Consider the event Ak E Z, with predecessors pred(Aj) = {A 1 , A2, ... , Ak-d· Suppose that, given the outcomes of a subset pa(Ak) � pred(Ak) of its predecessors-called Ak 's parents-the event Ak is conditionally independent of all other preceding events, or CI[Ak, pa(Ak), pred(Ak)-pa(Ak)]. This structure can be depicted graphically as a directed acyclic graph (DAG): each event is a node in the graph, and there is a directed edge from node Ai to node Ak if and only if Aj is a parent of Ak. We also refer to Ak as the child of Aj. A DAG has no directed cycles and thus defines a partial order over its vertices. We assume without loss of generality that the event indices are consistent with this partial ordering; in other words, if Aj is a predecessor of Ak then j < k.
We can write the joint probability distribution in a (usually) more compact form: M Pr(A1A2 ···A M)= IT Pr(Aklpa(Ak)).
k =l
For each event Ak, we record a conditional probability ta ble (CPT), which contains probabilities Pr(Aklpa(Ak)) for all possible combinations of outcomes of events in pa( Ak). Thus, it is possible to implicitly represent the full joint with 0 (M · 2max{q( k )}) probabilities, instead of 2M-1, where q(k) = lpa(Ak)l is the number of parents of Ak.
A Markov independence is a special type of conditional in dependence (Darroch et al., 1980; Pearl, 1988; Whittaker, 1990) . The node Aj and the set of nodes X � Z -Aj are Markov independent, given another set W � Z -X -Aj, if CI[Aj, W, X] and Aj U W U X = Z. Recall that Z is the set of all modeled events.
A DAG is an independency map, or an /-map, of a proba bility distribution Pr if every independency implicit in the graph holds within Pr (Pearl, 1988) . Note that a complete graph is a trivial 1-map of any distribution over n.
A DAG is decomposable if there is an edge between every two nodes that share a common child (Chyu, 1991; Dar roch et al., 1980; Pearl, 1988; Shachter, Andersen, & Poh, 1991) . Trees are a subset of decomposableDAGs, since ev ery node has at most one parent. Complete graphs are also decomposable since every two nodes are connected. Any BN can be made decomposable by reorienting some edges and introducing new edges where needed (Chyu, 1991; Shachter et al., 1991) . Though the decomposable repre sentation can be exponentially larger than the original BN, it can still be exponentially more compact than the full joint distribution. The independencies encoded in a decompos able BN are all Markov independencies (P earl, 1988) .
EQUILIBRIUM IN A SECURITIES MARKET
EQUILIBRIUM AS CONSENSUS
The standard formulation of competitive equilibrium (3) is as a fixed point where each agent's demand is optimal at current prices, and each security's price balances aggregate demand. In this section, we examine an alternative charac terization of equilibrium, recognized first by Dreze (1987) .
Agent i's first-order condition for x� j) is:
is its payoff in state w, and 1 wE Ak is the indicator function that equals one if w E Ak, and zero otherwise. Applying the chain rule
wE n and solving for pU>, we find that:
. L: wE A ; Pri(w)u� (r; w >)
In words, equilibrium can also be considered a fixed point where exchanges among agents induce a consensus on risk neutral probabilities across available securities, and where the security prices themselves match these agreed-upon values.
COMPLETE MARKETS, COMPLETE CONSENSUS, AND PARETO OPTIMALITY
As described in Section 2.3, a securities market is com plete when S == 101-1 and all securities are linearly inde pendent. In such a market, equilibrium allocations of risk are Pareto optimal: any gamble, contingent on any event E � n, that is an acceptable purchase for one agent is not an acceptable sale for any other (Arrow, 1964) . A probability distribution over n has dimensionality IOI-1 (normalized likelihoods for the 101 states). Prices of se curities in a complete market constitute 101 -1 linearly independent equations for these 101 -1 unknowns, and thus define unique probabilities for all states w E 0, also called the state prices (Huang & Litzenberger, 1988; Var ian, 1987) . Denote these probabilities as Pr0(w), and let Pro(E) = L: w E E Pro(w) be the price-probability of any event E, perhaps not directly corresponding to an available security.
The agents' risk-neutra i distributions also have dimension ality 101 -1, subject to the S constraints defined by (4).
If the market is complete, it follows that Pr�N is uniquely determined, and equals Pr0 for all i. That is, a complete market induces a compete consensus on risk-neutral proba bilities. This suggests an intuitive explanation of why equi librium allocations are Pareto optimal. All agents behave as if they are risk-neutral (payoff-maximizing) with identical beliefs. In such a situation, there are simply no differences of risk-preference or opinion on which to trade.
If S < 101 -1, then the consensus on risk-neutral prob abilities is generally incomplete. Whenever Pr� N ( w) -:j; Pr�N (w) for any w, there exists an acceptable exchange between agents h and i, though perhaps not supported by the S available securities. An equilibrium allocation in an incomplete market is not necessarily Pareto optimal. 1 But it can be, depending on the particular belief structures of the agents. Call a market operationally complete if its compet itive equilibrium (x, p) is Pareto optimal (with respect to the agents involved), even if the market contains less than 101-1 securities. As a degenerate example, an empty mar ket is operationally complete for an economy of completely identical agents. Although such a market does not support all conceivable trades, it does support all acceptable trades among the given agents.
STRUCTURED MARKETS: AN ANALOGY TO BAYESIAN NETWORKS
Achieving completeness is, practically speaking, all but im possible; the required number of securities--exponential in the number of primary events-is simply too huge.
In attempting to represent probability distributions over 0, researchers in uncertain reasoning are faced with an anal ogous combinatorial explosion. The typical solution is to work with the factored event space, rather than the state space, and to exploit any independencies among events us ing graphical models.
Continuing the analogy, securities markets can be struc tured according to the directed acyclic graph D of any BN. Simply introduce one conditional security (Aj lpa(Aj)) for every conditional probability Pr(Aj lpa(Aj)) in the net work. For each event Aj with q(j) = lpa(Aj)l parents, this adds 2q( j ) securities, one for each possible combina tion of outcomes of events in pa( Ai). Call such a market D-structured. Imagine for the moment that D is fully con nected (that is, no independencies are represented). Then aD-structured market contains "LJ: 1 2 i -l = 2M -1 = lf21 -1 linearly independent securities, and is thus com plete.
The benefit of a BN representation, and likewise a struc tured market, obtains when D is less than fully connected, and thus the market contains less than lf21 -1 securities. What can be said in this case? Certainly, depending on the beliefs and utilities of the agents, inefficient allocations are possible. Nonetheless, under circumstances explored below, the smaller market may suffice for operational com pleteness.
COMPACT MARKETS I
CONSENSUS ON RISK-NEUTRAL
INDEPENDENCIES
Call a D-structured market a risk-neutral independency market, or an RNI-market, if, in equilibrium, Dis an 1-map of Pr�N for all agents i. That is, all agents' risk-neutral distributions agree with the independencies encoded in the market's structure. Paralleling our notation for true conditional independence, let CI�N [ Ai, W, X] denote the risk-neutral conditional independence Pr�N (Ai IW X) Pr�N (Aj IW).
Proposition 1 At equilibrium in an RNI-market, Pr�N (w) Pr�N (w) for all agents h, i and all states WE f2.
Proof.
The market contains "' M 2q( j ) securities,
UJ=l
imposing an equal number of constraints on every agent's risk-neutral distribution via ( 4 ). For each event, 1-mapness further imposes 2q( j ) (2 i -l-q( j ) -1) conditional independence constraints of the form CI�N[Aj,pa(Aj),pred(Aj)-pa(Aj)], for all combina tions of outcomes of events in pa( Aj) and all but one com bination of outcomes of events in pred(Ai)-pa(Aj) (the remaining one is implied by the others). Then every agent's risk-neutral distribution is subject to M 2::: 2q(
identical, linearly independent constraints. Therefore Pr�N = Pr�N for all h, i. 0
In an RNI-market, define the state prices Pr0(w) = Pr�N(w) as the unique probabilities over n that are con sistent with the prices of available securities and the inde pendencies of D. The following corollary establishes that equilibrium prices for any of the lf21 -1 -S "missing" securities are also derivable from Pr0• Corollary 2 Let (p ( l ) , . .. ,p<5)) be the equilibrium prices in an RNI-market. Introduce a new security (E). Then (p ( l) , ... , p( S ) , Pr0(E)) are equilibrium prices in the ex panded market.
Proof. Before the extra security is introduced, all agents' risk-neutral probabilities Pr�N (E) already equal Pr0(E), without buying or selling any quantity of the security. It follows that, with the additional security, the equilibrium condition (4) is satisfied with xiE) = 0 for all i, p(E)
Pro (E), and all other prices unchanged. 0
The number of secunties in an RNI-market, 0 ( M · 2max{ q( j )}), can be exponentially smaller than the 2M -1 required for traditional completeness. The following corollary shows that the more compact market supports allocations that are equally efficient.
Corollary 3 Every RNI-market is operationally complete.
That is, the equilibrium allocations x and state prices Pro in an RNI-market constitute an equilibrium in a (truly) complete market composed of the same agents.
Proof. By repeated application of Corollary 2, we can add the lf21 -1 -S securities necessary to complete the mar ket.Z For each new security, a price consistent with Pr0, coupled with zero demand from all agents, satisfies (4). All complete markets, regardless of structure, support the same equilibrium allocations and state prices (Huang & Litzen berger, 1988; Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Varian, 1987) . 0
Proposition 1 and its corollaries are equilibrium results only. We sketch here one possible procedure for reaching agreement on the market structure. time, the agent has zero demand for its new security, then it may retract the security. An additional condition for equi librium is that no agent desires to create or withdraw any markets. Then, in equilibrium, it should be the case that all agents' risk-neutral independencies agree with the market structure, and that the market is operationally complete. We might want to add a transaction cost for opening new mar kets, so that equilibrium only ensures that risks are hedged up to a threshold cost.
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF AR BITR AGE
Imagine that, after equilibrium is reached in an RNI-market, a redundant security is introduced, say (AM). The equilibrium price of (AM) is already determined (Corollary 2): it must equal Pr0(AM) = Pr�N (AM). Fur thermore, if the current price does not equal Pr0(AM ), then the market is not in equilibrium, and arbitrage is possible. For example, if p (A M } < Pr0(AM), then an outside ob server 0 could purchase it at the going price and sell it to any of the agents at price p * such that p (A M } < p * < Pr�N (AM) = Pr0(AM ). Although 0 does not have di rect access to Pr0(AM ), it is uniquely computable given the other prices and the independence structure of D.
If 0 can find an arbitrage opportunity by correctly pricing the redundant security, then 0 can perform Bayesian infer ence, which is #P-complete (Cooper, 1990) .
COMPACT MARKETS II: CONSENSUS ON TRUE INDEPENDENCIES
Equilibrium agreement on risk-neutral independencies may seem a somewhat strange condition, especially considering that the Pr�N are changing as transactions occur. Some authors argue that, since agents appear to act according to Pr�N and standard elicitation techniques reveal Pr�N, risk-neutral probabilities are in fact no less "real" than true probabilities (Kadane & Winkler, 1988; Nau & Mc Cardle, 1991) . However, while it seems reasonable that agents would have true independencies in common (Pearl, 1993; Smith, 1990) , it is harder to justify why their risk neutral independencies would coincide. This section de velops a theory of compact markets based on consensus on true independencies. If, despite any quantitative differ ences between Pri and Pr�N, an agent's true independen cies were always manifest as risk-neutral independencies, then results concerning RNI-markets would carry over un changed. Section 6.1 demonstrates that this is indeed the case for a subclass of agents and a subset of independen cies. Section 6.2 discusses how known limitations of belief aggregation procedures restrict the possibility of obtaining compact markets under more general circumstances.
CONSENSUS ON MARKOV INDEPENDENCIES
A commonly assumed risk-averse utility form is exponen tial utility: ui(!-l) = -e-c•I-L. This utility form is synony mous with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), where Ci is agent i 's coefficient of risk aversion, or 1/ ci its risk tol erance. As the agent's wealth increases, its marginal utility for unit dollars decreases (since it is risk-averse), but the amount of its aversion to risk remains constant at Ci.
In where the second precondition must hold for all possible joint outcomes of the events in W, and all pairs (X, X) of dif f erent joint outcomes of events in X.
Proof. 
Thus the constraint on utility in (5) is satisfied, and any Markov independencies are observable.
We are now in a position to derive the main result of this section.
Proposition 5 When all agents have CARA, every decom posable !-market is an RNI-market.
Proof. Let Wj be the set of direct parents and direct chil dren of event A1, and X1 all other events. From decompos ability and 1-mapness, we can infer that I. CI; [A1, Wi, Xi J for all agents i and events j, 2. none of the securities (A1 lpa(Aj)) that are contingent on A1 depend on x1, and 3. none of the securities (Ak lpa(Ak)) such that Aj E pa(Ak) that are conditional on Aj depend on Xj.
Items 2 and 3 ensure separability of payoffs from the available securities (we assume that any prior stakes are also separable).
Then, invoking Proposition 4, CI�N[A1, w1,X1] for all agents i and events j. As ar e sult, D is an 1-map of every Pr�N regardless of allocations or prices, including those at equilibrium. 0 Proposition I and Corollaries 2 and 3 are immediately ap plicable. In particular, for agents with CARA, every de composable !-market is operationally complete.
INHERENT LIMITATIONS
One might wonder whether compact !-markets are possi ble for larger classes of agents or independencies. It can be shown via counterexample that, even when all agents have CARA, a market conforming to agreed-upon (possi bly non-Markov) independencies will not always be oper ationally complete. Moreover, when all agents have log arithmic utility for money (another commonly assumed utility form), even a market conforming to agreed-upon Markov independencies will not always be operationally complete.
Although we do not have a formal statement of impos sibility, results from statistical belief aggregation suggest that agreement on true independencies will not be suffi cient in general to yield compact and operationally com plete markets. The state prices Pro in a securities market are a function of all the agents' beliefs (and their utilities), and as such essentially constitute a measure of aggregate belief. Many researchers have studied belief aggregation functions (Genest & Zidek, I986) , and several impossibil ity theorems severely restrict the class of functions that pre serve unanimously held independencies (Genest & Wagner, 1987) , even when restricted to independencies among the primary events (P ennock & Wellman, 1999) . The aggre gation "function" of a securities market is of course sub ject to the same limitations. We suspect that, for many configurations of agents, markets structured according to unanimously-held true independencies will not yield prov ably optimal allocations of risk. Nevertheless, it may well be the case that structured markets can yield approximately optimal allocations over a wider range of agent popula tions.
CONCLUSIONS
Rational risk-averse agents will seek ways to mitigate the dangers inherent in an uncertain world by reducing their exposure to risk. Whenever two agents exhibit divergent tolerances for risk (e.g., an insurance company and a home owner), or disagree on the likelihood of world outcomes (e.g., a bettor on St. Louis to win Super Bowl XXXIV and a bettor on Tennessee), there may be an opportunity for an exchange of state-contingent wealth--essentially a port folio of securities-that both agents deem beneficial. To guarantee that all desirable exchanges of risk are supported, a market must be complete, or contain at least 2M -1 lin early independent securities, where M is the number of rel evant uncertain events. Clearly, this number of securities is prohibitive in even modestly complex domains.
In this paper, we showed that the same principles used to succinctly represent joint probability distributions can aid in reducing the required number of securities. We illus trated how markets can be structured analogously to Bayes ian networks. We derived two conditions under which com pact markets-in some cases with exponentially fewer se curities than complete markets--can still support all desir able exchanges of risk. The most general condition is that all agents' risk-neutral independencies agree with the inde pendencies encoded in the market's structure. For popula tions of agents with constant absolute risk aversion, agree ment on Markov independencies is sufficient.
We plan to evaluate empirically whether structured markets can yield efficiency gains even when agents do not meet all of these theoretical sufficiency requirements. As a poten tial future application, one might imagine structuring a set of derivatives so as to increase opportunities for agents to hedge their risks, while at the same time keeping the num ber of financial instruments required at a minimum.
